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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

remedies if it concludes that a discharge creates unreasonable
pollution or occurs without a valid permit. Therefore, since section
22a-430 governs permits, Fish Unlimited should have intervened with
the Department or in any administrative hearing challenging the
Northeast Utilities' conduct and permit renewal application in order
to have successfully waived the aggrievement requirement. Instead,
Fish Unlimited sought to use section 22a-16 to raise permitting claims
governed by section 22a-430. The state supreme court, therefore,
found that Fish Unlimited lacked standing to bring the action
pursuant to section 22a-16 in superior court and affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the claim.
Elizabeth Appleton
Peck v. Edelman, No. CV 97056833S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1903
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2000) (holding a high water mark boundary
of an abutting property to a non-navigable waterway did not alone
create usufructuary, riparian rights in such abutting property owner).
Windham Frog Pond ("the pond") was a twenty-one acre, nonKeith Peck ("Peck") owned land
navigable, artificial waterway.
abutting the western boundary of the pond. Peck brought this action
against Steven Edelman ("Edelman"), who allegedly owned the pond.
Edelman gave others permission to use the pond. However, Peck did
not feel he needed such consent. Peck contended Edelman interfered
with his riparian and/or littoral rights and sought a temporary and
permanent injunction to prevent Edelman from blocking access to the
pond.
The trial court granted a temporary injunction to preclude
Edelman from denying right of entry to the pond. Edelman filed a
two-count counterclaim, alleging trespass and seeking a declaratory
ruling from the court as to the parties' rights in and to the pond.
The Superior Court of Connecticut first looked at the chain of
title, both of the pond and abutting lands, and found no evidence to
support Peck's alleged entitlement to water rights of the pond. The
court concluded Peck merely owned the land abutting the pond, and
such land encompassed a high water mark boundary. The court found
the pond was located completely on the land owned and controlled by
Edelman. The court stated that under Connecticut law, high water
mark property lines for non-navigable waterways constituted the
watercourse shore on which property abuts.
The court then addressed Peck's rights in the pond. While Peck
alleged ownership through bordering property to the pond, Edelman
claimed possession through sub-aqueous pond land. The court noted
that riparian rights are neither an easement in the water nor an
appurtenance to the land. The court stated such rights constituted a
property right, which was inseparably annexed to the ownership of
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land adjoining a watercourse. The court acknowledged such rights are
usufructuary. Furthermore, title to the land under the stream is
indicative of riparian ownership. Using Connecticut law, the court
reaffirmed that ownership of the soil carries with it usufructuary
ownership of the above water.
The court then focused on
Pennsylvania law, which states when a non-navigable pond exists,
where the land under the water is owned by others, no riparian rights
attach to the property bordering on the water. An attempt to exercise
any such rights by invading the water constitutes a trespass.
Based upon the aforementioned law, the court held Peck had not
claimed title to any sub-aqueous land and the evidence indicated that
he held title only to the land abutting the high water mark of the
pond. Therefore, the court found Peck possessed no riparian rights.
Accordingly, the court dissolved the temporary injunction against
Edelman and enjoined Peck from any use or entry upon the pond
without the Edelman's consent.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
Queach Corp. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, No. 430078, 2000 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2283 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2000) (holding
amendments to town wetlands and watercourses regulations are
facially valid).
On July 29, 1999, the Inland Wetlands Commission
("Commission") adopted amendments to the Town of Branford's
Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations ("Amendments").
Queach Corporation ("Queach"), which owned land adjacent to and
including a substantial area of wetlands, appealed the Amendments'
facial legality.
Queach contended the Amendments defined "regulated activity"
more broadly than, and in conflict with, the Connecticut General
Statutes. The Amendment definition specified as regulated a number
of activities within 100 feet of wetland or watercourse boundaries. The
Amendments also authorized the Commission to regulate such
activities within upland review areas or other non-wetland or nonwatercourse areas when the activities affect wetlands or watercourses.
The court cited to a Connecticut Supreme Court opinion that held
an administrative regulation was presumed valid unless it was
inconsistent with or beyond the authorizing statute. The court also
found legislative expression of a strong public policy, supported by
case law, emphasizing public interest to preserve and protect wetlands
and watercourses from unregulated uses. Therefore, the court broadly
construed the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act ("Act") as
applying to activity that occurs outside of, but affects, wetlands areas.
The court explained the Amendments did not expand the Act, but
rather itemized specific activities that could be regulated under the

